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Abstract: A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a side-
payment (SP) market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount
of an ideal utility-money of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point
when there is “enough money” in the system, if it is “well distributed” the new
game will be a SP game. This game can also be related to a pure NSP game
where a set of default parameters have been introduced. These parameters play a
role similar to the parameters specifying the interpersonal comparisons in the side-
payment game. We study this game for the properties of the λ−core and consider
both the conditions for the uniqueness of competitive equilibria and a new approach
to the second welfare theorem. A discussion of the relationship between market
games and strategic market games is also noted.
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This essay takes a first step in exploring the relationship between models of monetary
exchange considered as no-side-payment or side-payment games in coalitional form.
It also considers some basic problems in the relationship between games in strategic
form and coalitional form. However, as there are several difficulties that need to be
overcome, the approach adopted here is to note and label the important ones, but
to confine this analysis to a limited scope.
The transfer of any commodity of value is a transfer of utility. In an advanced
economy, specially a market economy, money provides a sophisticated and general
way to transfer utility. Problems concerning fiat money have been dealt with else-
where (see [16] ) and are not considered further here. We confine our remarks to an
ideal commodity money and to a credit system.
The ideal commodity money has a constant marginal utility for all, hence it
enters all utility functions as a linear separable term. The linearity of utility in
this commodity qualifies it as a Marshallian money. We also assume that the total
endowment of this commodity is bounded and no one is able to hold it in negative
quantities.
We consider a credit system as an alternative to the economy with Marshallian
money. There is a relationship between a competitive equilibrium (CE in short)
of an exchange economy viewed as the λ-core of an NSP game and a competitive
equilibrium of an exchange economy with enough commodity money to become an
SP game.
In terms of monetary theory, the credit balancing required in the NSP game
can be interpreted as the outcome from the functioning of a perfect “inside money”
system. In contrast the limiting core point in the SP game can be interpreted as
the outcome from an economy with “outside money” only. Figure 2 shows the
relationship between the two outcomes and the NSP and SP games for an example
with three CEs. In each case the individual marginal utility of money and credit
are in the same proportions for all.
In the game in strategic form that is related to the NSP game, it is as though
there is a perfect clearinghouse that permits individuals to create their own credit;
it then takes in all bids and offers and centralizes the calculation of market clearing
prices that avoid default.1 In contrast, in the game in strategic form associated with
the SP game, prices are formed in a decentralized manner at individual trading posts.
1The association of the appropriate game in strategic form with the game in coalitional form
requires a separate discussion which will be investigated in a separate paper.
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If the underlying economy has multiple equilibria, the λ-core construction selects
one of them. Figure 2 shows the possibility of three CEs: CEλ, CEλ′ , and CEλ′′ .
But with the selection of a vector of λs, a single λ-core will be eventually selected as
the traders’ Marshallian money endowments are increased. The SP game associated
with CEλ has been constructed and CS is the limit core in the associated SP game.
Our concern is with welfare economics and competitive equilibria as well as the
core of an appropriately defined market game.
2 Two Basic Models
An exchange economy is an array E = {(X i, ui, ai)}i∈N , where X i is consumer i’s
consumption set, ui : X i −→ < his utility function, and ai ∈ X i is his endowment.
An allocation for E is a n-tuple of consumption bundles x = (x1, · · · , xn) with
xi ∈ X i, for all i. Allocation x is feasible if ∑i∈N xi ≤ ∑i∈N ai. A competitive
equilibrium (CE) for E is a pair (x̄, p̄) with an allocation x̄ and a price vector p̄ such
that (i) for all i ∈N, x̄i maximizes ui subject to budget constraint p̄ · xi ≤ p̄ · ai,
xi ∈ X i; (ii) x̄ is feasible.
2.1 Model 1: The Marshallian General Equilibrium Model
Let λ be a vector in <N++ and let α be a vector in <N+ . We use the pair (λ, α) to gen-
erate another exchange economy Eλα = {(X iλ, U iλ, aiλ)}i∈N from E = {(X i, ui, ai)}i∈N
by letting (i) aiλ = (a
i, αi); (ii) X iλ = <m+ × X im+1 for some closed convex sub-
set X im+1 ⊆ < such that αi ∈ X im+1; and (iii) U iλ(xiλ) = ui(xi) + λixim+1, for
xiλ = (x
i, xim+1) ∈ X iλ. In Eλα, good m+1 yields a constant marginal utility for each
consumer and hence, can be considered as a Marshallian money. Correspondingly,
the vector α is considered as representing the initial distribution of the Marshallian
money.
Notice that by redistributing the Marshallian money endowments, consumers
can transfer their utilities at rates prescribed by the ratios of λi, i ∈ N . However,
utility transfers are restricted by the nature of X im+1, i ∈ N , as well as by the initial
distribution α. Notice also that the utility functions U iλ(x
i
λ) = u
i(xi) + λixim+1 in

















Thus, given λ ∈ <N++, provided that there is enough Marshallian money which is
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Furthermore, for any given CE of E , there exists an appropriately selected vector
of parameters λ = (λ1, λ2, λ3, ..., λn) such that for all α ∈ <N+ , the given CE of E
remains to be a CE for Eλα that does not involve any net trade in the Marshallian
money. For example, this would be the case, if we let λi be the marginal utility of
income of consumer i at the given CE.
As the Marshallian money is increased the Pareto surface of Eλα in utility space
will be enlarged with a hyperplanar area appearing and growing on the surface. To
see this more clearly, define a λ-transfer segment Hλα by








αi,∆ui ∈ λiX im+1, i ∈ N},
where λiX im+1 denotes the multiplication of λ
i and X im+1. This segment consists of
vectors of consumers’ utility changes achievable by redistributing the Marshallian
money endowments. Given a feasible allocation x for economy E , the set of utility
allocations achievable from this allocation via the Marshallian money is
u(x) +Hλα,
where u(x) denotes the utility allocation (u1(x1), · · · , un(xn)).
The introduction of the increasing amounts of the Marshallian money has the
effect of both raising and flattening the Pareto surface of the exchange economy.
For the instance where there are only two consumers a simple diagram in Figure 1
indicates how the Pareto surface moves out and flattens
Figure 1: The flattening of the Pareto optimal surface.
Let ū be a weighted welfare maximum with welfare weights 1/λ1 for consumer 1
and 1/λ2 for consumer 2. Then, given Marshallian money endowment distribution
α = (α1, α2) with α1, α2 > 0, the Pareto surface of Eλα contains the line segment
with end points ū+ (λ1(α1 + α2), 0) and ū+ (0, λ2(α1 + α2)). To see this, consider
any utility pair (ū1 + λ1x̄
1
m+1, ū2 + λ2x̄
2
m+1) ∈ ū + Hλα for some redistribution
(x̄1m+1, x̄
2
m+1) ∈ X1m+1 ×X2m+1 of the total Marhsallian money endowment α1 + α2.
4
If the utility pair were Pareto dominated, then there would be a utility pair ũ
achievable in E and a redistribution (x̃1m+1, x̃2m+1) ∈ X1m+1 × X2m+1 of the total
Marshallian money endowment such that
ũ1 + λ1x̃1m+1 > ū
1 + λ1x̄1m+1 and ũ















This contradicts the fact that ū is the weighted welfare maximum of E with welfare
weights w1 = 1/λ1 and w2 = 1/λ2.
2.2 Fiat money, Default, and Uniqueness
The full details of the link between an explicit strategic market game and either the
general equilibrium or the market game model are not presented here, they are dealt
with in a subsequent essay. However, a way of imagining a playable game is that
as soon as the individuals put up their goods for sale the clearing house extends a
line of credit to each, but requires that after exchange and the netting of sales and
purchases all accounts clear.
But if this is truly a game of strategy where individuals offer goods for sale, and
bid to set prices, unless a perfect clearing house calculates matching prices, there is
no guarantee that, in general, accounts will always balance. After credit settlement
some individuals may have a residual credit and others may have a deficit. A rule
to settle default must be supplied. A natural way to account for this situation is to











i(xi) + µi min[xim+1, 0]






m+1 is the difference between the monetary value of
his endowment ai and the monetary payment that i makes for purchasing commodity
bundle xi.
But if a vector of penalties µ = (µ1, µ2, ..., µn) is specified, this is tantamount to
selecting the marginal utilities of income as parameters, rather than as variables as
2The key feature is that at the point of default the marginal disutility of the penalty for
defaulting is greater than the marginal utility of the gain from the extra increment of expenditure
and beyond that point the penalty need only to be sufficiently harsh as to always discourage
default. Any functional form that satisfies these conditions will suffice.
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in the Slutsky or Hicks analysis. If the µi are selected so that µi = λi where λi is the
Lagrangian multiplier associated with individual i’s utility maximization problem
at a CE of E , this imposes on the underlying game extra constraints sufficient to
guarantee this CE to be the unique one that survives these extra constraints (see
[5]).
2.3 Model 2: The Game in Characteristic Function Form
Associated with Model 1 is a market game represented by a characteristic function
without side-payment (an NSP game in short) as in Shubik [12] and Debreu and
Scarf [2]. As the amount of Marshallian money is increased a class of NSP games is
created that can be described as quasi-side-payment games. At one extreme, with
no Marshallian money there is the pure NSP game and at the other extreme when
there is “enough money, well-distributed’ (to be specified below) the game becomes
a pure side-payment game.
We are concerned with several explicit questions concerning the underlying NSP
game and the associated class of quasi-SP games culminating in fully SP games
under the appropriate conditions.
1. What happens to any multiple competitive equilibria as a Marshallian money
is introduced?
2. Precisely what is meant by “enough money, well-distributed”?
3. What can we say about the structure of the core and its convergence in
the process of replication when there is enough Marshallian money which is well
distributed?
3 Enough Money, Well-Distributed, and Trans-
ferable Utility
3.1 Ideal gold or real u-money
The basic idea behind there being enough money in an economy that utilizes a
commodity money is that whatever the transactions constraints may happen to
be on any individual, there is sufficient money in the system that one can find
a distribution of the money such that no individual is constrained by cash flow
conditions.
The concept of enough money in an economy has always been peculiarly institu-
tional, depending on custom of payment, details in the transactions technology and
6
possible variations in velocity. We can, however, make precise the upper bound on
the requirements for a money. The greatest amount of money required by an econ-
omy is given by the underlying sell-all condition, where all individuals are mandated
by the rules of the game to sell all of their (non-monetary) assets, i.e. we require
that all goods must pass through the market. Thus the quantity of money required









but for this money to be well distributed we also require that the optimization for







3.2 Liquidity, Super-Liquidity, Fiat and Transferability
When we consider a game with a special “u-gold” where all non-monetary goods
must go through the market, there are four zones that must be considered. They
reflect the idea of liquidity: (i) there is not enough money in the economy; (ii) there
is just enough money but it is not well-distributed; (iii) there is just enough money
that is well-distributed; and (iv) Each individual has enough “u-gold” to buy all of
the non-monetary assets in the economy.3
We note that the required condition that all goods (except u-gold) must go
through the market brings in a subtle distinction in the concept of ownership and
the definition of the value of a one-person coalition. The valuation of a coalition
depends on the price at which the coalition’s ownership claims are sold.
If there is not enough money in a one period strategic market game there is
no interior solution and the shadow price of money is above its utilitarian worth.
If there is enough money in a one period strategic market game but it is badly
distributed there is no interior solution as trade for at least some individuals will be
constrained by a cash flow constraint. This situation can be rectified by introducing
a money market. The treatment of this possibility will be dealt with in a separate
3We note that the merchantlist fallacy that the unbounded accumulation of monetary gold
represents an unbounded increase in the wealth of the society [7]. would not be a fallacy in a
society with the existence of a gold with linearly separable utility in a sell-all economy. Enough
money in a sell-all economy is precisely equal to the monetary value of all non-monetary goods.
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paper establishing efficiency with ρ = 0. If there is enough money in a one period
strategic market game and it is well distributed there is an interior solution.
With a separable linear utility for money and sell-all trading enough money calls
for the wealth of all other goods to equal the amount of money. There is enough
liquidity for all agents to purchase everything. Beyond that point the only other
qualitative change brought on by extra liquidity is when each individual could pur-
chase all goods. We might term this super-liquidity where with no prior knowledge
of how the initial resources are distributed all individuals will have enough money
to at least be able to purchase any ownership bundle assigned to them.4
4 Competitive Equilibrium and Second Welfare
Theorem with Marshallian Money
Let E = {(X i, ui, ai)}i∈N be an exchange economy. For all i, we assume A1: X i =
<m+ ; A2: ui is continuous, concave, and strongly monotonically increasing; and A3:




h > 0 for h = 1, 2, · · · ,m. A2
implies that all CE price vectors must be strictly positive. By A3, for i ∈ N there
exists a commodity h such that aih > 0. Consequently, A2 and A3 together imply
p̄ · ai > 0 at each CE price vector p̄. On the other hand, A 4 implies that for each
commodity h, there exists a consumer i for whom aih > 0.
Given price vector p, consumer i’s utility maximization problem in economy E
is:
maximize ui(xi)
subject to p · ai − p · xi ≥ 0, xi ∈ <m+ .
UMi(p)
Let p̄ be a price vector. Then, A2 and A3 imply that the problem UMi(p) satisfies
all the assumptions of the Saddle-Point Theorem (See [18], p. 75). It thus follows
that x̄i solves UMi(p̄) if and only if there exists a Lagrangian multiplier ξ̄i > 0 such
that 5
ui(xi) + ξ̄ip̄ · (ai − xi) ≤ ui(x̄i) + ξ̄ip̄ · (ai − x̄i) ≤ ui(x̄i) + ξip̄ · (ai − x̄i) (3)
for all xi ∈ <m+ and for all ξi ∈ <+.
4Going beyond an exchange economy, there is a more general question concerning the relation-
ship between a no-side-payment and a related side-payment game. Is there a reasonable measure
of “side-paymentness”?
5By the strong monotonicity of ui, all Lagrangian multipliers must be positive.
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Given a vector of welfare weights w = (wi)i∈N ∈ <N+ with w 6= 0, the weighted








i −∑i∈N xi ≥ 0, xi ∈ <m+ , i ∈ N. WWM(w)
A, A2, and A4 together imply that the problem WWM satisfies all the assumptions
of the Saddle-Point theorem. Hence, x̄ = (x̄i)i∈N solves the problem WWM(w) if
and only if there exists a vector p̄ ∈ <m+ of Lagrangian multipliers such that∑
i∈N w
iui(xi) + p̄ ·∑i∈N(ai − xi)
≤ ∑i∈N wiui(x̄i) + p̄ ·∑i∈N(ai − x̄i)
≤ ∑i∈N wiui(x̄i) + p ·∑i∈N(ai − x̄i)
(4)
for all xi ∈ <m+ , i ∈ N , and for all p ∈ <m+ .
4.1 Competitive Equilibrium with Marshallian Money
With the presence of Marshallian money, we normalize the prices so as to make
the price of the Marshallian money equal to 1. For (λ, α) ∈ <N++ × <N+ , let Eλα =
{(X iλ, U iλ, aiλ)}i∈N be the economy generated from E as in Section 2.1. Consumer i’s





subject to pλ · aiλ − pλ · xiλ ≥ 0, xiλ ∈ X iλ.
UMi(p, λ, α)
Let p̄λ be a CE price vector for Eλα. As before, with A1-A3 consumer i’s util-
ity maximization problem UMi(p̄, λ, α) satisfies the conditions of the Saddle-Point
Theorem. Consequently, x̄iλ = (x̄
i, x̄im+1) solves UM
i(p̄, λ, α) at if and only if there
exists a Lagrangian multiplier ξ̄i > 0 such that
ui(xi) + λixim+1 + ξ̄
i(p̄ · ai + αi − p̄ · xi − xim+1)
≤ ui(x̄i) + λix̄im+1 + ξ̄i(p̄ · ai + αi − p̄ · x̄i − x̄im+1)
≤ ui(x̄i) + λix̄im+1 + ξi(p̄ · ai + αi − p̄ · x̄i − x̄im+1)
(5)
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holds for all xi ∈ <m+ , xim+1 ∈ X im+1, and for all ξi ∈ <+.
If no one uses the Marshallian money to finance consumption of the commodities
in a CE of Eλα, then it reduces to a CE for economy E . Conversely, each CE,
(x̄, p̄), for E can be embedded into a CE for Eλα with arbitrary distribution of the
Marshallian money, but with each consumer i’s marginal utility of the Marshallian
money equal to the Lagrangian multiplier associated with problem MUi(p̄). Notice
also that with these marginal utilities of the Marshallian money, no net transfers in
the Marshallian money are needed.
Remark 1: Let (λ, α) ∈ <N++ × <N+ be given and let (x̄λ, p̄λ) with x̄λ = (x̄, x̄m+1)
and p̄λ = (p̄, 1) be a CE for Eλα. Then, x̄iλ = (x̄i, x̄im+1) solves UMi(p̄, λ, α) for all
i;, hence, the bundle solves (5) for some Lagrangian multiplier ξ̄i > 0. In case when
ξ̄i = λi, x′iλ = (x̄
i, x′im+1) also solves UM
i(p̄, λ, α′) whenever α′i − x′im+1 = αi − x̄im+1.
When ξ̄i = λi for all i ∈ N , x̄ is a weighted welfare maximum for E with wi = 1/λi.
Furthermore, (x̄′λ, p̄λ) with x̄
′
λ = (x̄, x̄
′
m+1) is a CE for Eλα′ whenever α′i − x̄′im+1 =
αi − x̄im+1 for all i ∈ N . This implies that any utility allocation on the flat portion
of the Pareto frontier can be achieved via a CE of Eλα′ for a suitable redistribution
α′ ∈ <N of the Marshallian money endowments prescribed by the allocation α.
4.2 An Alternative Formulation of the Second Welfare The-
orem with Marshallian Money
From the first welfare theorem, each CE allocation is a welfare maximum of some
weighted welfare function (e.g., with welfare weights equal to the inverses of the con-
sumers’ marginal utilities income associated with the CE allocation). The converse
is, however, not necessarily true unless one can change the consumers’ incomes as
shown by the second welfare theorem. We want to know if the converse can hold
with the introduction of a Marshallian money. Specifically, let x̄ be a solution for
WWM(w) with w ∈ <N++. We want to know how large αi has to be in order for x̄ to
be a CE allocation for Eλα with λi = 1/wi for all i. The following theorem provides
an answer.
Theorem 1 Assume A1-A4. Let w ∈ <N++ be a vector of welfare weights, x̄ a
commodity allocation that solves WWM(w) with w ∈ <N++, and let p̄ ∈ <m+ be
such that (x̄, p̄) is a saddle-point for WWM(w). Set (i) λi = 1/wi; (ii) x̄im+1 =
max{0, p̄ · (ai− x̄i)}; and (iii) αi = max{0, p̄ · (x̄i− ai)} for i ∈ N . Then, (x̄λ, p̄λ) =
((x̄i, x̄im+1)i∈N , (p̄, 1)) is a CE for Eλα.
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Proof: Since (x̄, p̄) satisfies (4) and since, by (i), λi = 1/wi, taking xj = x̄j for j 6= i
we have from (4)
ui(xi) + λixim+1 + λ
i(p̄ · ai + αi − p̄ · xi − xim+1)
≤
ui(x̄i) + λix̄im+1 + λ
i(p̄ · ai + αi − p̄ · x̄i − x̄im+1)
(6)
for all xi ∈ <m+ , xim+1 ∈ <+. Next, by (ii) and (iii), αi− x̄im+1 = p̄ · x̄i− p̄ ·ai. Hence,
p̄ · ai + αi − p̄ · x̄i − x̄im+1 = 0. It follows
ui(x̄i) + λix̄im+1 + λ
i(p̄ · ai + αi − p̄ · x̄i − x̄im+1)
≤
ui(x̄i) + λix̄im+1 + ξ
i(p̄ · ai + αi − p̄ · x̄i − x̄im+1)
(7)
for all ξi ∈ <+. Together, (6) and (7) imply that the triplet (x̄i, x̄im+1, ξ̄i) with
ξ̄i = λi satisfies (5). Consequently, by the Saddle-Point Theorem, x̄iλ = (x̄
i, x̄im+1)
solves UMi(p̄, λ, α).
To complete the proof, it only remains to show that the allocation x̄λ is feasible.











p̄ · (x̄i − ai).














This last inequality holds because, as a weighted welfare maximum, x̄ is feasible.
Theorem 1 provides an alternative formulation for the Second Fundamental The-
orem of welfare economics. To understand this formulation, notice first that at
welfare maximum x̄ with welfare weights w, some consumers may violate budget
constraints and others have budget surplus when evaluating endowments ai and
bundles x̄i at shadow prices p̄. Now add good m + 1 to the economy and let it be
measured in the unit of account as determined by the shadow prices p̄, so that its
price is 1. If each consumer i values this additional good at a constant rate equal
to λi = 1/wi, then the welfare maximum x̄ becomes part of a CE by allowing those
consumers whose budgets are violated at (x̄, p̄) to finance the extra expenses with
11
good m + 1, while allowing the others with budget surplus to purchase it at price
equal to 1. It is as if we subsidize those who needs extra income with good m + 1
and at the same time increase the others’ utilities for possessing it.
Notice also that under the market implementation of x̄ as a CE commodity al-
location for Eλα, consumers’ marginal utilities of income are exactly the inverses
of their welfare weights. The implementation does not require changes in the con-
sumers’ entire endowments. Rather, it requires the existence of an additional good,
a Marshallian money, that yields a constant marginal utility equal to λi = 1/wi for
all i.
4.3 Characterization of the CEs with Marshallian Money
Given λ ∈ <N++ and given α ∈ <N+ , how different are the CE commodity allocations
for Eλα from those that solve WWM(w) with w = (1/λ1, · · · , 1/λn) in E? The
following theorem provides an answer.
Theorem 2 Assume A1-A4. Let (λ, α) ∈ <N++×<N+ , (x̄λ, p̄λ) = ((x̄i, x̄im+1)i∈N , (p̄, 1))
be a CE for Eλα, and let ξ̄i be a Lagrangian multiplier associated with UMi(p̄, λ, α).
Then, (i) p̄ · x̄i + x̄im+1 = p̄ · ai + αi; (ii) ξ̄i = λi when x̄im+1 > 0; (iii) ξ̄i ≥ λi when
x̄im+1 = 0; (iv) x̄ solves WWM(w) with w = (1/ξ̄
1, · · · , 1/ξ̄n) in E; and (v) x̄ solves













i, xi ∈ <m+ , i ∈ N.
Before proving the theorem, a few comments are in order. Property (i) needs
no comment. Property (ii) says that a consumer who keeps a positive amount of
the Marshallian money has marginal utility of income equal to his marginal utility
of the Marshallian money. This is necessary because the price of the Marshallian
money is 1, so that the consumer can increase his utility by increasing his quantity
of the Marshallian money when ξ̄i < λi or by decreasing the quantity when ξ̄i > λi.
Similiar reasoning can be given for property (iii). Property (iv) states that the
commodity allocation x̄ actually solves the weighted welfare maximization problem
with w = (1/ξ̄1, · · · , 1/ξ̄n). In this maximization, less welfare weight is given to
a consumer, as compared to the inverse of his marginal utility of the Marshallian
money, whose budget would be violated were there no Marshallian money given
to him. Property (v), on the other hand, states that the commodity allocation
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x̄ can be a weighted welfare maximum with welfare weights exactly equal to the
inverses of the marginal utilities of the Marshallian money, provided the assignment
of commodity bundle xi to consumer i is penalized at a rate equal to (ξ̄i − λi) per
unit of total value p̄ · xi, for i ∈ N .
Proof: Since the triplet (x̄i, x̄im+1, ξ̄
i) satisfies (5), we have 6
(λi − ξ̄i)(x̄im+1 − xim+1) ≥ 0, ∀xim+1 ∈ <+. (8)




m+1 ∈ < such that 0 < x̃im+1 < x̄im+1 <
x̂im+1. Thus, by (8), both λ
i ≥ ξ̄i and λi ≤ ξ̄i must hold. This establishes (ii).
When x̄im+1 = 0, (8) implies (λ
i − ξ̄i)xim+1 ≤ 0 for all xim+1 ≥ 0. Hence λi ≤ ξ̄i.
This establishes (iii). Since λi > 0, it follows from (ii) and (iii) that ξ̄i > 0. With
ξ̄i > 0, the equality p̄ · xi + x̄im+1 = p̄ · ai + αi in (i) follows directly from the second
inequality in (5).
To show (iv), notice that (ii) and (iii) together with the feasibility of the alloca-























i. Dividing both sides of the
first inequality in (5) by ξ̄i for i ∈ N , property (iv) follows from (5), (9), and (10).























i. Now dividing both sides of
the first inequality in (5) by λi for i ∈ N and rearranging the terms, property (v)
follows from (5), (11), and (12).
6Inequality (8) follows by letting xi = x̄i be the commodity bundle and xim+1 be arbitrary in
the first inequality in (5).
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4.4 The Uniqueness of the CE with Marshallian Money
In this section we show that the CEs for Eλα are unique if, among some other
standard conditions, the Marshallian money endowment distribution satisfies a cer-
tain lower bound. To this end, we first establish a lemma that shows that when
consumers’ are endowed with large enough amounts of the Marshallian money, the
marginal utilities of the money prescribed by λ coincide with the Lagrangian mul-
tipliers of the consumers in all the CEs of Eλα.
For i ∈ N , let X̂ i be the set of consumption bundles in X i each of which is
determined by a feasible allocation of E . That is, X̂ i is the projection of the set of
feasible allocations of E onto consumer i’s consumption set X i. Standard results in
general equilibrium analysis imply that X̂ i is a compact subset of X i.
Lemma 1 Assume E = {(X i, ui, ai)}i∈N satisfies A1-A4. Then for any λ = (λi)i∈N ∈
<N++ and for any i ∈ N , λi is the only Lagrangian multiplier for utility maximization





| xi ∈ X̂ i
}
. (13)
Proof: Let (λ, α) ∈ <N++×<N+ such that α satisfies (13) and let (x̄λ, p̄λ) be a CE for
Eλα. Then,
ui(x̄i) + λ
ix̄im+1 ≥ ui(ai) + λiαi
which is equivalent to




This together with (13) implies x̄im+1 > 0. Thus, by (ii) in Theorem 2, λ
i is the only
Lagrangian multiplier for MUi(p̄, λ, α). .
We are now ready to establish conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of CE
for Eλα.
Theorem 3 Assume E = {(X i, ui, ai)}i∈N satisfies A1, A3, and A4. Assume fur-
ther A2′: ui is continuous, strictly concave, and strongly monotonically increasing.
Then, for any λ ∈ <m++, Eλα = {(X iλ, U iλ, aiλ)}i∈N has the weighted welfare maxi-
mum with welfare weights 1/λi as the unique CE commodity allocation for initial
distributions α ∈ <N+ of the Marshallian money such that αi satisfies (13) for all i.
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Proof: Let λ ∈ <N++ be given. Since A2′ implies A2, Lemma 1 implies that for
all α ∈ <N++ satisfying (13), the Lagrangian multiplier associated for consumer i’s
utility maximization problem MUi(p̄, λ, α) is unique and equal to λi in any CE of
Eλα.
Fix α ∈ <N++ satisfying (13) and let (x̄λ, p̄λ) = ((x̄i, x̄im+1)i∈N , (p̄, 1)) be any CE
of Eλα. Then, by (5), ξ̄i = λi implies
1
λi
ui(xi)− p̄ · xi ≤ 1
λi
ui(x̄i)− p̄ · x̄i, (14)
for all xi ∈ X i and for all i ∈ N . Consequently, for any feasible allocation x =















the weighted welfare function is strictly concave; hence, it has a unique maximum
point. This in turn implies that Eλα has a unique CE commodity allocation.
Given λ ∈ <N++, condition (13) can be considered as the condition of enough
money which is well-distributed for the uniqueness of the CE in Eλα. Theorem 3
confirms our earlier remark that when there is enough Marshallian money which is
well-distributed, the CE problem in Eλα is reduced to a joint maximization of the
total λ-transfer utility function in (2).
Remark 2: Let (λ, α) ∈ <N++ × <N+ be such that α satisfies (13) and let x̄ be
the weighted welfare maximum with welfare weights equal to 1/λi. Theorem 3
shows that x̄ is the unique CE commodity allocation for Eλα. Given any CE price
vector p̄λ = (p̄, 1), the corresponding CE Marshallian money allocation is uniquely
determined through budget constraints: p̄ · x̄i + x̄im+1 = p̄ · ai + αi for all i ∈ N . By
Lemma 1, λi is the Lagrangian multiplier for MU i(λ, α) at p̄λ. Hence, by saddle-
point characterization (5), λip̄ ∈ ∂ui(x̄i). It follows that the CE Marshallian money
allocation is also unique if, in addition, ∂ui(x̄i) has a unique element for all i ∈ N .
This would be the case if the utility functions are differentiable. We end this section
with a numerical illustration of the reduction from multiple CEs to a unique CE as
the Marshallian money is increased.
Example 1: Consider the 2-person economy in [11]. There are two goods, 1 and
2, and two consumers, Ivan and John with endowments aI = (40, 0) for Ivan and
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aJ = (0, 50) for John. Ivan has utility function uI(xI) = xI1 + 100(1 − e−x
I
2/10) for
xI ∈ <2+ while John has utility function uJ(xJ) = 110(1−e−x
J
1 /10)+xJ2 for x
J ∈ <2+.
There are three CEs in this economy as shown in [11].



















110(1 − e−xJ1 /10) + xJ2 + λJxJ3 . It can be checked that without the non-negativity







x̄I = (40− 10 ln 11λI
λJ
, 10 ln 10λ
J
λI











x̄Jλ = (10 ln
11λI
λJ
, 50− 10 ln 10λJ
λI












Thus, Eλα has a unique CE whenever the Marshallian money allocation in (15) is
non-negative, which holds if and only if





























Since there are three CEs without any Marshallian money, it follows that given
λ ∈ <N++ satisfying (i), the number of CEs in Eλα reduces from three to one as α is
increased to eventually satisfy (ii). Figure 2 provides an illustration.
Figure 2: The Pareto surface and transfer plane.
5 Salvage Values with Fiat and Marshallian Money
A fundamental difference between the economies with fiat or Marshallian money is
that in the former the money does not provide a physical static store of value, in
the later it does. Fiat money is supported by default laws and expectations. Its
store of value features are in the dynamics (Bak, Norrelykke and Shubik [1]). In
contrast Marshallian money is a direct store of value, reflected in the static model
of equilibrium
7Simple calculation shows that these ratios are the rates of utility transfers implied by Pareto
optimal allocations without any Mashallian money.
16
5.1 Clearinghouse credit, redistribution and salvage values
5.1.1 The selection of arbitrary weights: Competitive equilibria and
individual endowments
In conventional general equilibrium theory initial resources for each individual and
preferences are given. The Lagrangian multipliers λi associated with a CE are
calculated. Above we also have considered a somewhat different problem. Suppose
that the utility comparison weights µi (or penalties) are given, as are the total


















where, with accounting credit only, the last term is a positive or negative amount
of final credit.8 We need to distinguish two cases: (1) Clearinghouse credit with
individual endowments not given and (2) Clearinghouse credits with given individual
endowments.
The distinction between an economy with full clearinghouse credit and one with
“enough” fiat money well distributed must be made. The price level in an economy
depends on volume of trade, velocity of transactions, and whether or not there is a
physically defined specific amount of money and credit in the economy. The default
conditions given by the µi place a lower bound on prices without default, as the
lower the prices sink, the more attractive default becomes.
The upper bound on prices is defined by the amount of money and credit in the
system and the transactions technology. There are two intuitively reasonable ways
to construct a mathematically precise model, we can consider a well defined extreme
case where all goods must be sold (sell-all); or a buy-sell model where individuals












j − aij, 0] ≤ aim+1.
8The possibility of xim+1 being positive reflects expectations for its use in a future period. The
negative reflects the severity of the default penalty. The dimensions of the penalty are utility/(unit
of money).
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The clear upper bound is provided by the sell-all model. The institutionally close
model is where individuals can sell or buy more of their assets.
5.1.2 Clearinghouse credit with unknown individual endowments
A reasonable assumption is that at most all that is known is the aggregate amount
of goods held in the economy. Thus if we wish to make sure that there is enough
money around to be able to achieve efficient trade when only aggregates are given
we need to consider what distribution of assets will generate the largest amount
of trade. The sell-all model provides the extreme upper bound, but if the buy-sell
model is considered the volume of trade will depend on the distribution of the assets
and will be generically less than the sell-all.
5.2 Marshallian money, and redistribution
5.2.1 No money market
When the money is a physical commodity we may consider trade with or without
a money market or banking system. If we specify that all payments must be made
in u-gold and we have specified it as the numeraire with a price of pm+1 = 1 and
there is no creation or introduction of outside money or credit via a banking system,
international trade or a central bank then the quantity of money is well defined. The
specification of the quantity of money combined with sell-all and a velocity of 1 is
sufficient to specify a price level. Given the price level and the amount of trade we








5.2.2 A money market with enough money badly distributed





















then the economy as a whole has enough money yet individual i has cash shortage.
Notice that this maldistribution can be resolved by introducing a money market
with a rate of interest of ρ = 0.
6 The Core and Its Convergence with Marshal-
lian Money
Given (λ, α) ∈ <N++ × <N+ , we now turn to modeling of the core with Marshallian
money. For S ⊆ N , let x(S, λ) = (xi(S, λ))i∈S denote a weighted welfare maximum
for coalition S in E with welfare weights 1/λi, i ∈ S.
Lemma 2 Let E = {X i, ui, ai}i∈N be an economy satisfying A1-A4 and let λ ∈ <N++.
Then, for any α ∈ <N+ satisfying (13) and for any coalition S ⊆ N , its Pareto
optimal (PO) and individually rational (IR) allocations in Eλα are composed of the
commodity allocation x(S, λ) and reallocations of Marshallian money endowments
αi, i ∈ S.
Proof. Let (ȳi, ȳim+1)i∈S be a PO and IR allocation for coalition S. Suppose (ȳ
i)i∈S 6=





Since (ȳi, ȳim+1)i∈S is IR, we have
ui(ȳi) + λiȳim+1 ≥ ui(ai) + λiαi, i ∈ N
which implies
ȳim+1 ≥ αi −
ui(ȳi)− ui(ai)
λi
, i ∈ S. (17)
By (16) and (17),
ȳim+1 + T
i ≥ αi − u
i(xi(S, λ))− ui(ai)
λi
, i ∈ S. (18)
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It follows from (13) and (18) that ȳim+1 + T
i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S.9 Thus, yim+1 + T i ∈




























where s is the number of traders in S. By (16) and (19),
ui(xi(S, λ)) + λix̄im+1 = u





> ui(ȳi) + λiȳim+1, i ∈ S.
This contradicts the assumption that (ȳi, ȳim+1)i∈S is PO for coalition S.
Lemma 2 implies that given λ ∈ <N++, condition (13) also provides a lower bound
on the endowment of Marhsallian money for each trader that guarantees that the
IR portion of the Pareto suffice is flat for each coalition.
Definition 1 Given (λ, α) ∈ <N++ × <N+ , the λ-core of E = {X i, ui, ai}i∈N is the
core of Eλα.
An allocation in the λ-core of E is not improvable by any coalition S, even if
members of the coalition can transfer utilities via the Marshallian money at rates
determined by λi, i ∈ S. A direct application of Lemma 2 establishes
Theorem 4 Let (λ, α) ∈ <N++ × <N+ be such that α satisfies (13). Then a utility
vector u is in the λ-core of E if and only if there exists a distribution (xim+1)i∈N of
α such that
ui = ui(xi(N, λ)) + λixim+1, i ∈ N (20)














9Notice that the set of commodity bundles trader i ∈ S receives from feasible allocations for
coalition S is no bigger than X̄i.
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Proof. Let (λ, α) ∈ <N++ × <N+ satisfying (13) and let utility vector u be in the
λ-core. Then, u must be PO and IR. By Lemma 2, there exists a reallocation
(xim+1)i∈N of the endowments α such that (20) is satisfied. For coalition S, if (21)
is violated, then Lemma 2 implies that u is below the the PO and IR portion of the
utility set of coalition S in Eλα. This means that coalition S can improve upon u in
Eλα, which contradicts the assumption that u is in the core of Eλα.
Conversely, the utility vector u in (20) is feasible for the grand coalition in Eλα.
On the other hand, by (21), no coalition can improve upon u in Eλα. This concludes
that u is in the core of Eλα.
Given λ ∈ <N++, when the Marshallian money endowments satisfy condition (13),
Theorem 4 shows that the core of E with Marshallian money (in utility space) co-
incides with the core obtained when utilities are unlimitedly transferable at rates
determined by the marginal utilities of the Marshallian money. Consequently, condi-
tion (13) can be considered as a condition of enough money which is well-distributed
for the market game of Eλα to be transferable.
A direct application of Theorems 3 and 4 together with the usual core conver-
gence theorem establishes the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Assume E = {(X i, ui, ai)}i∈N satisfies A1, A3, and A4. Assume fur-
ther A2′: ui is continuous, strictly concave, and strongly monotonically increasing.
Then, for any λ ∈ <m++, the λ-core of E = {(X i, ui, ai)}i∈N converges to the unique
CE of Eλα in the process of replication, for all endowments α ∈ <N+ satisfying (13)
for all i.
7 Concluding Remarks
7.1 Comments on C-games
A c-game is a game that is well represented by the characteristic function form. An
example of a c-game is a game with orthogonal coalitions, i.e. as soon as a set of
players S has decided to act together, what N − S does is irrelevant (see [15]).
The link between the competitive equilibrium analysis and market games has
been made utilizing the concept of a Walrasian Market Game, which differs from the
Shapley and Shubik [9], [10] definition of a market game. This definition made use
of Edgeworth’s observation that a group S of traders could trade among themselves
regardless of the actions of the complementary group N −S. The Walrasian Market
Game has the extra condition requiring that all individuals must trade at a single
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price. Scarf [6] noted the difficulty in linking games in normal form with games in
cooperative form without discussing any explicit role for money or markets. His
approach was to consider the distinctions between the α − core and the β − core.
Considerably earlier Viner [19] had described the influence of the linking of markets
as a ”pecuniary externality”. Shubik [13] observed that Viner’s comments could be
interpreted in game theoretic terms as weakening the C-game property.
7.2 Comments on market games and strategic market games
In an explicit development of a noncooperative approach to studying the price sys-
tem Shubik [14], Shapley and Shubik [11] and Shapley [8] developed a class of games
in strategtic form called strategic market games. In a separate paper we address
the modeling problems in linking the normal form of the strategic market games
to the cooperative market games. Here we sidestep the basic problem by making
the assumption that we can adequately model the role of markets and money by
modifying the conventional Edgeworth type of approach to market games, consid-
ering the coalition S to be orthogonal from N − S, although requiring all trading
arrangements to take place at a single price. We call these games Walrasian Market
Games. We further introduce the role of money by requiring that the optimization
satisfy not only wealth constraints, but cash flow constraints. When these con-
straints are introduced we have Money Market Games. We justify this by arguing
that as a reasonable first approximation the existence of the core will depend on
large coalitions and these are almost orthogonal, i.e. if S is almost the size of N
then N − S scarcely influences S. Heuristically we can consider a coalition of size
n− 1 and show that it generates at worst (max min) an inefficient imputation ε(k)
away from the CE where as the replication k grows it becomes arbitrarily close to
the CE but does not attain it.
7.3 The Edgeworth, Walras, money, money market, and
bank cores
The Edgeworth core provided a means to show the emergence of price system. The
Walras core analysis takes an axiom of one price as given. It would seem that by
Occam’s razor adding such an axiom is unnecessary. However it serves as means to
start to reconcile market games with strategic market games and to enable us to
both maintain a high level of abstraction, while catching the essence of a monetary
economy with cash flow constraints. This in turn leads to being able to define and
analyze not only a money core but games involving a money market or a central
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bank. Here we have constrained the analysis to the simplest case of a side-payment
money core.
7.4 Institutions and invariant properties
The general equilibrium analysis is presented at a high level of abstraction, but the
cost of the assumptions made was that no process model was specified with the
existence proof of the efficient price system. The strategic market game formulation
offers a process model, and, if constrained to minimal institutional forms presents
a reasonably parsimonious set of models. However as soon as the extensive form
involves more than one or two players there is an enormous proliferation of special
cases, many of which can be associated with the myriads of financial institutions
and instruments which have evolved since the emergence of organized economies.
The market game formulation is at a higher level of abstraction (there is a many
to one mapping from exchange economies to market games). The Walrasian and
cash flow modifications to the market game provide an opportunity to encompass
the properties of the cash flow constraints and the role of money and credit without
the institutional detail, but in such a manner that the connection to the strategic
market games and their institutional richness can be made.
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